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This article is a critique of Ulrich Beck’s advocacy of a cosmopolitan 
approach to global inequality and human rights. It is argued that 
cosmopolitanism does not bring a new and unique perspective on global 
inequality. In fact Beck’s proposals on migration would reinforce inequality 
and anti-cosmopolitanism. It is argued that his ‘both/and’ perspective on 
hybridisation and contextual universalism is undermined by inequality, 
conflict and power that are glossed over in Beck’s approach. I argue that 
human rights interventionism as advocated by Beck falls short of 
cosmopolitanism, in ways which are shown by qualifications about power 
and inequality that Beck himself makes in his arguments. 
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This article focuses on the implications of Ulrich Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology 
and politics for understanding global inequality, human rights and power. Beck 
has creditably stated that his desire is to outline an alternative to neoliberal and 
postmodernist responses to globalization, by formulating a politics oriented 
around social and human goals, including through global political interventions 
(eg, 2006: 57-71, 115-6 and, on neoliberalism and responses to it, see 2000: 
introduction and chs 4 and 5). Underpinning this is his prescription of a 
sociological approach which attempts to break with methodological nationalism in 
favour of more global and cosmopolitan vision for social science. Beck is a public 
intellectual in Germany and beyond, identified with a left liberal agenda, on the 
surface of it critical of neoliberalism, and with cosmopolitan proposals. He has 
affinities with sometimes similarly characterised authors such as the 
cosmopolitan sociologists Anthony Giddens and David Held.  
 
Despite his important positive intentions, and a powerful analysis of possible 
political responses to neoliberalism, difficulties and contradictions undermine 
some of Beck’s key claims on global and cosmopolitan issues. Flaws in his 
sociology of globalization and cosmopolitanism are at the basis of problems in 
his global political prescriptions on international inequality and human rights. An 
important argument in this article is that the proposal of a co-operative 
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humanitarian global politics fails to work when set against a critical sociological 
perspective on world politics as structured by conflict and power, including 
between nation-states, rather then common consciousness and collaboration, as 
posited by Beck. Beck’s approach glosses over conflicts, inequalities and 
injustices in world society and harmonises contradictions within a benign and 
optimistic view of international relations. A key concern here is that some of 
these problems in Beck’s theory are brought out by internal contradictions within 
it.  
 
My focus in this article is on Beck’s perspective on global inequality and human 
rights in his books Cosmopolitan Vision (2006) and What is Globalization? (2000) 
and associated articles (eg Beck 2000a, Beck and Sznaider 2006), but they are 
relevant also to his books Power in the Global Age (2005; see also Grande and 
Beck 2007), and, in parts, to other cosmopolitan approaches to human rights and 
inequality (eg Kaldor 2003, Held 2000, Archibugi and Held 1995). Beck’s 
concerns in his writings on globalization and cosmopolitanism follow from his 
earlier work on risk society (Beck 1992, 1999), although in ways I do not have 
space to discuss here. Likewise a number of criticisms of this earlier work 
focuses on divisions of class, gender and power and, as such, have links with my 
own critique here (eg, see Mythen 2004; Rustin 1994). My focus is on his more 
recent work on globalization and cosmopolitanism as yet less fully discussed by 
critical analysts.  
 
Methodological nationalism, cosmopolitanism and global inequality 
 
Beck criticises methodological nationalism and advocates the replacement of 
what he sees as a redundant national outlook or container theory of society with 
a more cosmopolitan vision. One place where he says this applies is in making 
sense of global inequality. Here he suggests that previous perspectives have 
been too methodologically nationalist to understand global inequalities and that 
cosmopolitanism provides a new perspective that can do so for the first time.  
 
In Cosmopolitan Vision Beck argues that global inequalities get ‘at best only 
marginal attention in methodological nationalism’ (2006: 38-40). There are two 
main aspects to this argument. Firstly, he says that inequalities are justified by 
the performance principle. Inequality is justified by the dynamism and productivity 
its incentives are said to bring to society and, therefore, the overall wealth it 
produces. Methodological nationalism he says uses this performance justification 
internally to give inequality a positive legitimation. Cosmopolitanism shows how 
the nation-state principle legitimates global inequalities. Secondly, Beck argues 
that the national outlook being nationally inward-looking conceals global 
inequalities. It legitimates global inequalities negatively by concealment, 
therefore, as well as positively by justifying them (2006: 38).  
 
There are a number of questions here. First Beck argues that methodological 
nationalism justifies internal inequalities using the performance principle. 
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However one of sociology’s great contributions has been to be critical about 
inequality and expose inequalities of class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality and 
their negative effects on life chances and power. Sociology has been at the 
forefront of the analysis of social divisions, from Marx and Weber onwards 
through neo-Marxists, neo-Weberians and others in the 20th century (eg see 
Giddens 1981; Crompton 1998). The performance principle as justification has 
been exposed by sociology through a counter-focus on the ill-effects of 
inequality, rather than reproduced by it as Beck suggests.  
 
A second issue relates to comparative sociology. Beck says that the nation-state 
principle has stopped global inequalities being exposed. But comparative 
sociology while sticking to the nation-state principle, as he has argued critically 
that it does, can show up inequalities globally through international comparison. 
Comparative sociology, almost by definition, shows up global inequalities on a 
cross-national basis.  
 
Thirdly, dependency theory and world systems theory have been important 
schools of thought in sociology which have shown inequality globally (eg see 
Harrison 1988). This has been partly in relations in which they continue to show 
the nation-state as important and shows that methodological nationalism is 
compatible with understanding global inequality and not necessarily an 
introverted legitimation for it as Beck claims. But it has also shown this in 
relations of interdependency, ie in transnational relations of a more global sort. 
One of the criticisms of dependency theory has been that it does not show 
enough of an introverted nation-state principle, attributing too much of global 
inequality to the dependency of the poor on the developed world, and failing to 
attribute enough of the blame to factors internal to states, such as corruption and 
internal wars. Far from being too inwardly nationally-focused to see global 
inequalities, some schools in the sociology of development which have 
thoroughly analysed global inequality have been criticised for attributing it too 
much to external factors and insufficiently to factors internal to the nation-state. 
(For a recent discussion of studies of international inequality and development 
within the context of globalization see Kiely 2007).  
 
Given these factors, Beck’s characterisation of methodological nationalism as 
unequipped to be conscious of global inequality seems problematic. This raises a 
fourth issue. Beck justifies his approach by changing his characterisation of 
methodological nationalism from one which analyses international relations from 
the point of view of the nation-state and relations between nation-states to one 
which sees methodological nationalism as ‘introverted’, ie not oriented to external 
relations which he is saying here are unequal. The way he can criticise 
methodological nationalism for legitimating global inequality by not analysing 
external relations is by defining it here as ‘introverted’. This goes against Beck’s 
definition of methodological nationalism elsewhere as open to externalist analysis 
but from the point of view of inter-national nation-states relating to one another 
rather than with a view of more supra-national global relations (ref). If Beck had 
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continued with the latter more externalist definition it would have shown that 
there is an analysis of global inequalities in an externally conscious 
methodological nationalism. It is by introducing a stronger definition of 
methodological nationalism based on introversion that it is possible to define it as 
blind to social inequality transnationally.  
 
Alternatively Beck can argue that the national outlook can be aware of 
inequalities between nations but because this stays at the level of differences 
between nations this is still a national outlook and not a global perspective above 
and beyond nations (2006: 79-80). Yet it is at the level of analyses of inequalities 
between nations that understandings of global inequality lie and approaches 
mentioned such as world systems theory and dependency theory take this 
beyond the level of nation-state comparisons. It is wrong to criticise inter-national 
perspectives when they do show up inequality across the world, and wrong to 
see them as restricted to simply relations between nations when they look at the 
dependency that maintains global inequality.  
 
Fifthly, Beck’s characterisation of methodological nationalism as introverted does 
not give concrete references to literature that is methodologically nationalist in 
this globally unaware sense. Yet there is reference to literature on global 
inequality. So there is a skewed referencing of literature. Beck mentions that 
which supports his perspective, ie literature on global inequality, but not 
references which would back up his criticism of alternative perspectives as 
lacking (eg 2006: 38-9). This makes Beck’s own analysis appear as a new 
cosmopolitan perspective which brings to sociology for the first time an 
awareness of global inequalities, but only in relation to a deficient alternative 
which is never concretely referenced. Brevity in evidence and lack of referencing 
to literature being criticised are also problems elsewhere in Beck’s theory. 
 
Sixthly and related to the previous point, Beck underestimates previous literature 
and this is connected to an overestimation of the role of the cosmopolitan 
perspective in being able to expose global inequality. So, for instance, he argues: 
‘a common assumption, but one which is seldom consistently thought through 
and examined, is that national inequalities may be globally rather than nationally 
determined … due to capital flows, crises and upheavals … Only in the 
cosmopolitan outlook … do these restrictions on thought, inquiry and research 
become clear and can they be overcome’ (2006: 39). So cosmopolitanism is 
stated as the perspective that can introduce systematic analysis of the global 
bases of inequalities for the first time. But this status and novelty for Beck’s work 
and the cosmopolitan perspective is given because it does not reference 
previous attempts which it is claimed have failed to meet these criteria. Yet there 
is work from Marx, through world systems and dependency theory and the whole 
field of development studies to recent theorists of globalization like Leslie Sklair 
(2002), to name just a few, which does analyse global dimensions of inequalities. 
The global bases of national inequalities caused by factors such as capital 
mobility, trade and integration has been a major research agenda in economics 
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and other social sciences (for recent contributions see Kaplinsky 2005 and Held 
and Kaya 2007). It is only possible for Beck to claim this novel status and 
ground-breaking role for cosmopolitan theory by leaving aside literatures of this 
sort on global inequality. 
 
An example he gives of the new insight that such a cosmopolitan perspective 
may bring is in the instance of developing countries asking developed western 
countries to move away from their protectionist agricultural policies and be truer 
to the free market principles they advocate by opening up their markets to 
developing countries.  This is seen as an example of the reproduction of global 
inequalities that the cosmopolitan outlook can reveal. But: a) this is not new 
information that required the cosmopolitan perspective for it to become visible. 
This contradiction has been discussed well beyond the confines of the 
cosmopolitan perspective which it is claimed uniquely has the conceptual 
equipment to be aware of such dynamics of global inequality. Left critics have 
exposed the protectionist hypocrisy of developed countries who advocate free 
trade, as have economic liberals. The inconsistency of developed countries on 
their own free trade prescriptions is regularly covered in news media coverage of 
world trade talks. (Again, a recent overview on such issues and literature is 
provided by Kiely 2007 and newspapers such as the neoliberal The Economist 
have covered such issues for years). Furthermore; b) Beck’s highlighting of the 
free trade hypocrisy of developed countries contradicts his argument for the need 
for a ‘break’ beyond methodological nationalism because this instance involves 
international and global relations but also decisions of states made in nation-
state interests and the sealing off of borders against globalization. In short Beck’s 
recognition of the importance of protectionism here shows the continuing 
importance of the methodological nationalism and anti-globalism he says is 
redundant in a new cosmopolitan era, at the levels of both awareness and reality.  
 
What the cosmopolitan perspective brings according to Beck is a perspective in 
which ‘the principles of national blindness to global inequalities lose much of their 
validity’ (2006: 40). But the status and novelty of cosmopolitanism claimed here 
is only possible by not referencing the long, rich and systematic literature in 
sociology and the social sciences on global inequality that I have mentioned. It 
asks those interested in this area to reject previous analyses, which it is said 
problematically are methodologically nationalist and confined by national 
introversion, and to find the first proper analysis of global inequality in his 
cosmopolitan framework. This only works by an underestimation or denial of the 
past and an overestimation of the novelty of cosmopolitanism.  
 
Immigration and global inequality 
 
In fact Beck argues for an arrangement which it seems would reproduce rather 
than reduce global inequality (2000a: 92-4 and 2006: 108-9). He advocates a 
division of labour between low skilled jobs in poor countries and higher skilled 
work being done in richer countries and says this would involve a ‘cosmopolitan’ 
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sharing (ie division) of labour that would not require migration. Rather than low 
skilled workers being imported into Europe, the low-skilled work would be 
exported to them. This is in the context (2006: 108) of a discussion of the 
possibility that he feels neoliberalism could take a cosmopolitan turn. Here he 
says there could be ‘solidarity with strangers in the context of a global distribution 
of labour and wealth’.  
 
There are a number of issues here. First, Beck appears to be endorsing a 
proposal to restrict immigration into rich countries, so: a) siding with anti-
immigration forces and lending reinforcement to their arguments; b) undermining 
a device which could foster cosmopolitan mixing by the intermingling of people 
from different international backgrounds; c) reducing opportunities for the poor in 
rich countries; and d) going against migrations that would help provide solutions 
to the aging population and lack of younger workers in richer countries. In fact 
this argument for a system which would inhibit migration seems to be 
undermined, in a characteristic moment of inconsistency by his argument soon 
after (2006: 114) that immigrants contribute to welfare systems and provide a 
solution to aging populations.  
 
Secondly, Beck’s proposal endorses an unequal global division of labour 
between skilled work in rich countries and unskilled work in poor countries, and 
involves accentuating it by further exporting low skilled jobs from rich to poor 
countries. He has argued that cosmopolitanism is uniquely able for the first time 
to recognise global inequality but this proposal seems likely to reproduce 
inequality.  
 
Thirdly, he sees the proposal as having a cosmopolitan character based on 
solidarity with strangers over a global distance. This is optimistic. There is a 
Durkheimian notion of solidarity here, based on interdependence through 
different specialisations in the division of labour, with geographical distance 
added to the mixture to make these divisions more accentuated. For Beck the 
skilled rich will feel solidarity with the distant poor, and vice versa, because of a 
shared interdependence in the division of labour. Yet a polarisation of skilled and 
unskilled work and geographical distance seem more likely to increase division 
and conflict as Marx would have seen in his more conflictual and less solidaristic 
picture of the division of labour than in the more optimistic and benign 
Durkheimian view of Beck. The structure proposed by Beck seems to reinforce 
divisions along rich/poor global lines. This is increased through a further 
extension of the global division of labour, problematic on equality and social 
justice grounds, but also providing a basis for undermining global and domestic 
cosmopolitanism rather than promoting it.  
 
Overall, Beck is mistaken in positing a new and unique role for cosmopolitanism 
in understanding and solving global inequality. Furthermore, one form in which 
he puts it into practice leads to a proposal for a global division of labour which 
seems as likely to reinforce anti-immigration arguments, reproduce inequality and 
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reduce cosmopolitanism as reduce inequality and conflict in favour of a global 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
A cosmopolitan postcolonialism: hybridisation and power 
  
Beck also advocates a correcting of global inequalities in academic perspectives 
through a ‘leap’ to more postcolonial perspectives (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 13-
14) as an antidote to ‘the naïve universalism of early western sociology’. This 
would involve being open to many universalisms, conflicting contextual 
universalisms, and the postcolonial experience.  
 
There is no doubt that sociology and the social sciences have suffered from a 
‘western bias’ that lacks openness to postcolonial perspectives. But again Beck 
seems to underestimate previous contributions in globalization studies and so 
overestimate the new leap that cosmopolitanism would be instigating by 
introducing a postcolonial view and the necessity for such a leap to be grounded 
in a new cosmopolitan vision. What is needed is not a new leap, for that has 
been made by many theorists and empirical studies already. Examples in 
globalization studies could include Nederveen Pieterse’s (2004) work on cultural 
globalization and studies of the history of globalization by authors such as Abu-
Lughod (1989), Hobson (2004), Frank (Frank and Gills 1993), and others who try 
to correct the Euro-centrism of studies of modern western globalization. These 
authors themselves draw on a significant heritage of previous postcolonial 
theory.  
 
Beck suggests a new methodology, stated in the terms of an abstract meta-
theory that is not systematically grounded in evidence or references to the 
academic literature. However what is possible for postcolonialism is a grounding 
in analysis that already exists and the expansion and empirical development of 
existing perspectives. Postcolonialism is not a theoretical task for a new 
framework. A better approach would be the extension and critical interrogation of 
already existing post-colonialism in the social sciences and its empirical 
application.  
 
Where Beck does try to put into action his cosmopolitan postcolonialism it runs 
into trouble (eg Beck and Sznaider 2006). He advocates a ‘both/and’ perspective 
taking over from an ‘either/or’ perspective. This is good for bringing in previously 
excluded inputs to views that have stressed westernisation without 
understanding a mixture of influences including from non-western sources (eg 
Abu-Lughod 1989). However a ‘both/and’ view runs the risk of replacing 
westernisation perspectives with one in which power and inequality is glossed 
over by an attempt to resurrect understandings of the inputs of non-western 
societies. When different global societies meet there are often some that have 
greater economic, political and ideological power. To highlight this fact is not to 
endorse it. And it is not to say there are not real sources of opposition and 
alternatives to westernisation both academically and politically (in the latter case 
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from Iran to Venezuela for example). But positing a ‘both/and’ mix appears to 
give an equality to a mix of perspectives when there are great inequalities and 
power differences in that mix. In trying to give more of a role to inputs from 
beyond the West it runs the risk of playing down the western power that such 
inputs are subjected to.  
 
Beck’s own use of a ‘both/and’ hybridising postcolonialism (2000a:89) 
underestimates these power relations and inequalities. In a discussion of 
deregulation and flexibilisation which promote an informal economy, diluted trade 
union representation and weak states Beck suggests these are non-western 
standards being adopted by western societies. But the direction of power is the 
other way around. These are structures and effects of neoliberalism being 
exported by western-dominated governments and institutions to other western 
and non-western societies with the deleterious effects that Beck rightly suggests. 
Western power is underestimated here when neoliberalism is seen as an effect 
of the importation of poor regulation from the non-west to West rather than an 
expression of the corporate and state power of western interests.  
 
So the novelty and uniqueness of Beck’s cosmopolitanism for establishing a 
postcolonial perspective is justified by an understatement of the extent to which 
postcolonialism is already in existence and an overstatement of the role of 
cosmopolitanism in having a new role in establishing this itself. At the same time, 
his more hybrid postcolonial view, rather than restoring a greater emphasis on 
poorer countries’ contribution to globalization, may underestimate the power they 
are subjected to. Beck’s postcolonialism fits into a more general pattern in his 
work, of underestimating previous cosmopolitanism in social science, 
overestimating the novelty of his cosmopolitan vision, and leading down a road 
which rather than overcoming power and inequality seems as much to play down 
how significant it is.  
 
From the first age of international law to the second age of human rights 
 
Beck’s advocacy of a global cosmopolitan politics is oriented around the idea of 
humanitarian intervention to defend human rights as a principle of the second 
age of modernity. Beck argues that the second age of modernity has brought a 
shift from international law to human rights, something that underpins the arrival 
of a new cosmopolitan global politics. (See also Kaldor 2003, Held 2000, Fine 
2006). 
 
This seems to be influenced by an event at the time Beck was formulating these 
arguments – the Kosovo war, where western powers intervened militarily, 
ostensibly to stop ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the region. Ethnic cleansing evokes links 
with the holocaust and other genocidal phenomena and Beck’s advocacy of 
global cosmopolitan politics around the idea of a new age human rights is no 
doubt also connected with echoes of such incidences. Beck goes on to describe 
contemporary military interventions as military humanism, including the attack of 
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the USA and allies on Iraq in 2003. Beck is right to be concerned with the 
prevention of such crimes against humanity and to search for solutions at a 
global level, including an openness to military interventions if necessary, 
although it is not clear the humanitarian arguments that are applied to 
interventions like Kosovo can be enlarged to include also Iraq.  
 
Cosmopolitan Vision’s discussion of the human rights theme (eg 2006: 120-1) 
was published in 2004 and in English 2006 long after the Kosovo war and later 
examples such as the Iraq War. So while there seem to be ties to Kosovo, later 
incidences like Iraq, which have been explained by others in terms very different 
from human rights ones, have not deterred Beck from still characterising the 
second age of modernity in these terms. He continues with the theme of the 
second modernity as marked by a shift from international law overriding human 
rights to vice versa despite knowledge of interventions like Iraq, which he 
includes as an intervention consistent with the second age. He calls this shift an 
‘epochal difference between the first and second modernity’ (2006: 121) and ‘a 
paradigm shift from national societies to cosmopolitan society’ (2006: 122). So 
there is no questioning the significance of the shift he is positing.  
 
Beck talks of a ‘hegemonic power which “defends” human rights in foreign 
territories under the banner of “military humanism”’. What he questions is the 
‘self-authorisation’ of this military humanism but not whether humanism and 
rights are the right words to describe it. In other words, Beck questions the 
unilateralism of contemporary international military interventions and their lack of 
grounding in global agreement, but he does not question their characterisation in 
human rights terms. 
 
I will come back to the question of American power and the war in Iraq. But first I 
will fill out a little more what he means by the new human rights age and some 
questions about it.  
 
Human rights cosmopolitanism beyond power 
 
Beck argues that this new human rights regime of the second age overrides 
power (2006: 141). His vision is of global law in which ‘it is no longer the power of 
one state, or a plurality of states, but rather law that determines what constitutes 
peace’. Here global law would be oriented around human rights and, sometimes, 
would use war to bring peace.  
 
But it is questionable whether law can be taken out of the realm of the power of 
one state or of some states. Law is seen to become something that is set out at a 
global level and beyond states or power and there is no evidence at present that 
international or global definitions of law or war-making exist in such a vacuum 
away from state power. Nor is there is a realistic prospect that they could in the 
foreseeable future given the economic, political and military power wielded by the 
most powerful states and their orientation around their own national interests, 
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including in international fora where global agreements are made. At best global 
law, insofar as it does or may soon exist, is composed by states acting together 
in which some are far more powerful than others. Beck’s is a utopian vision 
without a convincing basis for seeing how human rights can or will be beyond this 
sort of politics or power. (Fine 2006 recognises some of these ‘ambivalences’ 
although he also decides to nevertheless maintain a cosmopolitan approach). 
 
A pattern in Beck’s work, as I have mentioned, is that his arguments are 
sometimes undermined by qualifications or contradictions he makes to them and 
this occurs with his argument about human rights beyond the power of states. 
Beck talks about the possibility of human rights as a way of the powerful 
imposing power (2006: 143). He argues that while global human rights empower 
powerless groups and persecuted individuals through recognition of their rights it 
also empowers powerful states to intervene in territorial states in a ‘new 
geography of power’. The concept of humanitarian intervention ‘is situated in a 
grey zone’ which opens up the possibility of actors pursuing their own national or 
hegemonic aims under the pretext of a cosmopolitan mission. Human rights he 
says involve weak and poor states giving the rich and powerful carte blanche for 
intervention. It leads to a cosmopolitan monopoly of the west on morality, law and 
violence. Referring to the shift from the first to the second age of modernity, Beck 
argues that human rights trumping international law is not just a question of 
values but also of a power regime, resulting from the end of the cold war and the 
military and political hegemony of the USA (2006: 123). 
 
This is a good analysis. But these are big qualifications to Beck’s optimistic view 
of a global human rights regime. They paint a picture of a situation where a 
regime based on human rights and common concern can easily be subverted by 
the rich and powerful in pursuit of national and hegemonic interests. In fact, Beck 
is saying this power imposition becomes more possible because of the 
legitimation that the human rights regime gives it.  
 
This brings us to the issue of human rights as western, which Beck himself raises 
(2006: 123). Beck says that human rights interpretations may be seen by some 
parts of the world as coming from the West and reflecting a specifically western 
view as opposed to more ‘African, Asian and Chinese’ views which put a stronger 
stress on duties and communitarianism (see also, amongst others, Zolo 1997: 
118-20). Beck does not provide a solution to this imbalance and this undermines 
his case which relies on human rights as a cosmopolitan global form. Here it is 
being suggested that human rights may be an expression of the view of actors in 
particular parts of the world more than others, something which is not very 
cosmopolitan and goes against some of his more cosmopolitan assertions 
elsewhere.  
 
Human rights and contextual universalism in Cosmopolitan Vision 
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In Cosmopolitan Vision Beck tries to avoid human rights as a western dominated 
thing by arguing for a perspective of contextual universalism, where universal 
norms are combined with respect for contextual differences (2006: 60). He 
sketches out an answer to the balance of universalism and difference which 
comes to a picture of hybridisation, a mixture or balance of universals with 
difference. He calls this ‘contextual universalism’ and it is intended to capture 
how universalism and difference can be combined, in this case by universalism 
that is received differently in varying places. Beck’s contextual univeralism is in 
accordance with his preference for a ‘both/and’ perspective over and ‘either/or’ 
one – you can combine both contextual and universalism without having to 
choose either one or the other. In this framework difference is compatible with 
universalism but there are still universals which guard against a world of 
complete differences which are incommensurable.  
 
This balancing of universalism and difference can answer the criticism that 
cosmopolitanism is just about westernisation at the expense of other inputs as he 
is saying universalising tensions can be counteracted by pluralist inputs into 
universalism wherever it is received. Beck argues that human rights with 
universal validity claims which are western in origin are not alien or irrelevant to 
non-western cultures and that local groups can make their contextual 
interpretations of human rights drawing on their own cultural and political 
traditions and religions. Universal law can, thus, be contextualised.  
 
Relations of power in this formulation do not come through. For instance, the 
implementation of human rights that dominates Beck’s cosmopolitanism is one in 
which humanitarian interventions are made in the affairs of nation-states 
militarily, overriding their sovereignty in order to protect human rights. But this 
sort of situation, which Beck focuses on a lot, however justifiable it may 
sometimes be, is one in which western norms of human rights are applied by 
superior military might and in which local interpretations of human rights do not, 
rightly or wrongly, stand too much of a chance. So it is not clear how contextual 
universalism is possible when concrete relations of power and might are 
introduced. 
 
One of the characteristics of Beck’s theory is that he often outlines such abstract 
frameworks without much concrete reference. In this case he does give 
examples of how he thinks a balancing of the universal and particular in 
contextual universalism rights can work. But the examples do not work 
adequately to back up the theory. One example given is of a human rights 
conference in 1993 where he says a synthesis of contextualism and universalism 
was worked out. The conference was concerned with issues such as violence 
against women and, although it is not completely clear, Beck seems to suggest 
that ideas of universal rights to education were balanced with the assertion of 
Muslim women that they were primarily Muslim and wanted to wear headscarves 
and embrace a conservative theology. Beck gives this as an example of his 
‘both/and’ cosmopolitanism.  
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But how concretely the balance between these opposite poles was maintained 
and worked out at the conference is not described. It is just stated that they were. 
This is significant because between western ideas of human rights and 
conservative theology (Muslim or otherwise) there may be many areas where 
they could clash and it is not described here how both inputs are balanced, in 
terms of the content of both discourses and in terms of how power relations work 
out when both sides find they come to contrary conclusions.  
 
Another example given is of a discussion on human rights between Senegalese 
and US experts in Dakar in which the Senegalese were able to raise the issue of 
the right not to die of starvation, in a humorous way, that left the US experts on 
the back foot because they had not raised it and had to admit they had not seen 
this as a right. It is not completely spelled out what Beck regards as cosmopolitan 
about this moment but it seems it is that the Senegalese brought in their own 
perspective on rights, a material and economic one, so contributing to a 
cosmopolitan mix. The Americans presumably focused on civil and political rights 
of a more liberal and post-materialist sort. And it seems that it is that the 
Senegalese did this in a humorous rather than confrontational way that also 
showed a cosmopolitan respect for difference.  
 
But this perspective: a) shows a contradiction of two perspectives where one has 
a view of human rights potentially at odds with the other, rather than a 
cosmopolitan mix. Often balancing different sorts of rights involves trade-offs, for 
instance civil and political rights being compromised in pursuit of economic rights, 
or vice-versa. This seems as much a situation of potentially conflicting views as a 
cosmopolitan mix; b) it does not account for the fact that the US delegation 
represented a state with greater power. Power differences are not accounted for 
in this example. They are important because they define what ideas of human 
rights can become most dominant and who has the most power to implement 
their own. In this case the Senegalese are said to have asserted their definition 
of human rights in a contextual universalist way, but it is not clear that in the 
world of political decision-making theirs has played an equivalent role to that 
expressed by delegates from the world’s leading hegemonic power. 
Methodologically there are issues here too. These are specific examples rather 
than systematic evidence. Examples illustrate a theory. Evidence which justifies it 
has to be more systematic than this.  
 
Contextual Universalism in What is Globalization? 
 
Contextual universalism in relation to human rights is something that Beck also 
argues for in What is Globalization? (2000: 83-86). He says that that common 
standards like human rights must hold across contexts, but that they may take 
different forms in different contexts. For Beck, there are no separate worlds and 
dialogue has to take place. Incommensurability is not possible and non-
interference is ruled out. ‘Glocal living has to be accepted’, meaning both local 
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difference but also global standards. So the stress is that while difference has to 
be recognised, universals cannot be avoided. There is the integration of the 
contextual into the concept of the universal. But Beck argues also that, at the 
same time, there are many universalisms in different contexts.  
 
Just as in Cosmopolitan Vision Beck also here brings the idea of contextual 
universalism to bear on the example of human rights. Human rights, he says, 
should not be allowed to be completely universalist – ie ones that can be 
imposed by the West everywhere. There are other concepts of human rights 
elsewhere in different versions. (2000: 85). In a situation of universal human 
rights but local ideas of them Beck argues that competition and dialogue between 
cultures, nations, states and religions can decide which conceptions of human 
rights are most ‘helpful’ for humans.  
 
But this is in the pattern of Beck’s optimism and glossing over of contradictions 
and conflicts. Contextual universalism involves more an admirable hope for 
deliberation and dialogue than an analysis of their possibility. There is an over-
optimism on the common basis in contextual universalism and on the extent to 
which successful inter-actor dialogue is possible on the idea of human rights.  
 
For example, different conceptions of human rights will conflict with one another. 
Rights can exist in economic, political, social and civil spheres and conflict with 
one another in these spheres. Rights to what or from what often conflict. Beck 
does not go further than to say there have to be universalisms and 
contextualisms amidst such problems which is a statement of what would be 
desirable rather than a theory of how this can be done, how tensions and 
conflicts could be resolved, concretely as well as theoretically and how 
contradictory interests are involved. Such tensions and conflicts often can’t be 
resolved and the outcome of them encountering one another can be not getting 
the balance between universalism and contextualism right but some ideas of 
human rights winning out over others. It would be better to evaluate competing 
interests and conceptions of human rights and where these may go than stating 
a wish for a common agreement amidst contradiction. The need for an analysis 
of conflict in preference over a presumption of consensus is a key argument of 
this article. 
 
Contextual universalism also does not provide a way in which things which are 
opposed to human rights might be dealt with when they clash with it, for instance 
egalitarianism and poverty-reduction. It also does not deal with the political 
reality, beyond abstract wishes, that some who support human rights wish 
sometimes to be excused from them when it is perceived to be in their self-
interest on other grounds, for instance for reasons to do with states’ perceptions 
of their needs to maintain security or power.  
 
Beck has a creditable desire to achieve global co-existence and agreement on 
the basis of an analysis of globalization which also recognises localisation. But 
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the possibility of global difference and dialogue operating at a global level does 
not follow because there are conflicts, contradictions and tensions. What is here 
is an attempt at a philosophical basis for global cosmopolitanism. There is an 
attempt to embed it in a conception of social reality – glocalisation. But this social 
reality is one where there are: a) contradictory versions of human rights 
(economic, social, civil, political etc); b) instances where human rights are 
subordinated to other concerns (eg equality, collectivism, religion, economic 
progress, etc); and c) instances where human rights are believed in but 
supported in an inconsistent and selective way according to considerations of 
interests and power, for instance in the case of the USA in relation to the 
International Criminal Court, Guantanamo Bay, torture and so on. A benign aim 
and well intentioned aspiration to contextual universalism does not identify the 
real contradictory and conflictual bases for ethics and so comes up with a 
political answer, contextual universalism, which is not up to the task of tackling in 
practice issues of ethical norms such as human rights.  
 
As we shall now see, where Beck goes beyond abstract ideas and attempts to 
grapple with what he sees as the universalisation of human rights at a concrete 
level there are problems. 
 
Global Cosmopolitan Politics and US Power 
 
Beck argues that in the politics of the second age of modernity the single state or 
nation-state is no longer the key actor. The key actor is global politics, composed 
in a cosmopolitan way. He sees a shift from politics based on nation-states and 
international security to non-state-centred post-international risk politics as a 
‘paradigm shift’ that ‘correlates with the distinction between first and second 
modernity’ (2006: 36). So for him cosmopolitan politics is something new and the 
dating given for its rise is post-cold-war.  
 
There is some ambiguity on the solidity with which cosmopolitan politics has 
arrived. Whether it is cosmopolitan awareness or reality that is upon us varies in 
Beck’s theory in general. One argument is that there is a global awareness of a 
shared collective future but not corresponding forms of political practice (2006: 
78). The politics of a collectively shared and threatened future, he says, enjoys 
only meagre institutional support. But in other places it is argued that 
cosmopolitanism is very advanced and irreversible in reality but that it is in 
awareness rather than reality where there may be counter movements (2006: 
74). As we shall see now there is another ambiguity where Beck, despite seeing 
cosmopolitanism as post-national, says that a nation, the US, is a key actor in 
making global cosmopolitanism a living thing in the contemporary world.  
 
One obstacle to the idea of a shared and fairly equal global cosmopolitanism is a 
view of the US as subverting global cosmopolitanism by exerting its dominant 
power that competes with and undermines global power and pursues national 
rather than global cosmopolitan interests. This is a view of US power held by 
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those from the neocon Right (eg Kagan 2003) to the radical Left (eg Chomsky 
2004). From both views America exerts dominant power in a way that 
undermines aspirations to global equality, does it by economic and military might 
and in its geopolitical national interests rather than with common humanitarian 
interests as its goal. This perspective on global power has to be shown to be 
lacking if global cosmopolitanism is to be defended as a realistic possibility.  
 
Beck overcomes this by a view of American power as about humanitarian 
intervention. The USA is seen as an actor that uses military humanism to enact 
the cosmopolitan human rights approach of the second age of modernity. Beck 
sees US power as compatible with global cosmopolitanism rather than opposed 
to it (eg 2006: 132-5). One model of global order, he says, is Pax Americana 
based on the principle of global responsibility and promoting humanitarian 
intervention (2006: 132). The difference between this and global cosmopolis is 
not in intentions or values like responsibility or humanitarianism but in that Pax 
Americana is hierarchical while global cosmopolis is more multilateral and based 
on equality and cooperation. So US power may not be organised in the most 
cosmopolitan way but it is cosmopolitan and humanitarian in content and intent. 
Pax Americana, Beck says, involves replacing the UN with the US (2006: 133) 
implying that their objectives are the same, it is the agency that changes. 
(Although he says this is ‘exaggerating somewhat’ implying that there may be 
qualifications to this).  
 
Beck says that in the US world military power can be concentrated and directed 
against new dangers and that the USA can ‘create an international system of 
freedom and fairness based on American values of freedom and democracy’ 
(2006: 133). To do so it must free itself from the principle of non-intervention, and 
restrictions on intervention include international agreements and institutions such 
as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United Nations Security Council, the 
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. Preventive war 
is necessary for this hegemonic role to be preserved. Beck ascribes this position 
to George Bush but then goes on to develop it in a way which is more abstracted 
and not linked to any source and so, evidently, expressing his own view (but with 
a vagueness in attribution which means while it seems that it is his view, it could 
be argued not to be the case).  
 
A key point here is that Pax Americana and global cosmopolitanism are 
distinguished on the basis of structure rather than aims, including US power also 
as humanitarian and cosmopolitan (2006: 132, 135). So in this picture the US is 
compatible with global cosmopolitanism rather than a threat which undermines it, 
which provides an alternative view to that of US power as part of a global politics 
of nations, inequalities and conflicts which undermine global cosmopolitanism. 
This allows Beck to go ahead with global cosmopolitanism, underplaying the 
threat from a perspective which sees the US as using its superior power in 




One reason Beck puts forward cosmopolitan consciousness as realisable is that 
in instances such as his analysis of US power he has too strong an idea of 
common agendas. For instance, his idea of cosmopolitanism is based on a 
liberal humanitarianism, which he puts the Bush administration within. With this 
categorisation of the Bush administration conflicts and differences are less 
significant and cosmopolitanism more realistic. This is because the US then fits 
in with a cosmopolitan framework rather than being seen as instrumental to 
structures of conflict and power that show such a framework to be problematic. 
However his view of the Bush administration, on such occasions, is over-
optimistic.  
 
For instance Beck describes the Bush administration as having a ‘democratic 
mission’ which is ‘a continuation of an original project of the liberal left’ (2006: 
119). In Cosmopolitan Vision the objectives of the US in the Iraq war are said to 
include WMDs, nuclear terrorism, regime change and democratisation (some of 
which had been discredited) but do not include aims such as oil, hegemony, 
national interest or geopolitical objectives (2006: 38-40, 120, 148, 151; 2006a). In 
short those which suggest the US pursuing its domestic and global interests do 
not get mentioned, despite being public issues in debates. The lack of inclusion 
of such interests, around which conflicts occur, gives a reason for optimism about 
cosmopolitan democracy. If they are brought back in the possibilities for 
cosmopolitanism look more problematic. If you see President Bush as not 
occupying a democratic humanitarian position then the prospects for global 
cosmopolitanism become less plausible because the world’s most powerful state, 
in military terms hugely more powerful than any other, is going against 
cosmopolitanism in its aims and substance and not just in the hierarchical and 
unilateralist way it pursues them.  
 
Other evidence for the idea of the US as cosmopolitan could also be questioned. 
In Cosmopolitan Vision Beck argues that the US and Europe have human rights 
foreign policies in accordance with the onset of the second age human rights 
regime (2006: 144ff). But the evidence given for this is a UN report, rather than 
actual US or European policy, and a statement from Madeleine Albright under 
the Clinton administration. This is weak evidence because it is from 
unrepresentative sources (ie the UN and Clinton administration), pre-Bush and is 
just two statements, and statements rather than actual policy. Many US and 
European actual policies are difficult to square with the claim. This fits into the 
pattern of evidential claims given by Beck which are often selective and more 
illustrative than systematic evidence.  
 
One way in which Beck justifies ‘military humanism’ is by setting up false ‘you are 
with us or against us’ alternatives which echo George Bush’s suggestion of such 
a choice in relation to the Iraq conflict (2006: 154). Beck argues that ‘if you are 
against ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, then you must support the 
new “war-peace” of “military humanism”’. There are a number of issues here. 
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First, is the reduction of alternatives to two when there are other choices between 
crimes against humanity on one side and wars against those crimes on the other. 
For instance there are more multilateral peaceful approaches. Second, wars on 
crimes against humanity are themselves diverse – for instance there are 
differences between ones pursued illegally or unilaterally and those pursued 
legally and multilaterally. The war of military humanism is itself not a simple 
choice as it can take different forms. Thirdly, Beck’s alternatives assume that the 
wars he has in mind are wars against crimes against humanity and not 
geostrategic or energy wars, as some would understand some of them. Fourthly, 
Beck groups together wars to eliminate WMDs with those to stop ethnic 
cleansing when these are different issues that may require different solutions. 
Mass murder within a country may in some cases require military intervention to 
stop it, but it is not necessarily the case that military action would be the best 
path in relation to the development of WMDs by the same state. Beck often puts 
Kosovo and Iraq, two different such wars, in the same category in this way.  
 
The contradictions of Beck’s arguments for US democratic humanism 
 
Beck’s arguments often contain internal inconsistencies. As I have argued, you 
do not have to go beyond Beck to find arguments which raise questions about his 
position. He sometimes does so by qualifications or contrary arguments he 
makes. This happens in relation to his argument about US democratic 
humanism. I wish to raise three issues in relation to which this happens – 1) 
illegality, 2) national benefits and 3) abridged cosmopolitanism.  
 
1) Illegality. Beck’s endorsement of the ‘war on terror’ extends to legitimation of 
illegality (2006: 146-7). The label terrorism, he argues, empowers and justifies 
states to free themselves from the constraints of laws of war. He says that the 
contempt of terrorists for morality or humanity can provoke abandonment of legal 
constraints and civilised constraints on use of force by the state. ‘Ineffectual 
international law’, he argues, is ‘blind to the new dangers’, and ‘not tailored’ to 
new threats. And Beck questions ‘what grounds the legitimacy of force in an era 
of new threats if legality is not tailored to these threats’. So there is an 
endorsement of illegal war if ‘war on terror’ is given as the legitimation for the war 
and international laws are seen as not up to the job or not respected by your 
adversary. Human rights here (assuming they are the basis for the war on terror, 
something which is contested) trump international law which does follow, to some 
extent, Beck’s emphasis on a shift from the latter to the former with the second 
age of modernity. At the same time, a lack of respect for international legality 
does not support global cosmopolitan politics which to be really cosmopolitan 
and globally inclusive must involve shared adherence to common international 
laws. A global cosmopolitanism would need actors to agree to such laws even if 
some sometimes saw them as ineffectual or not adhered to by all others. It is 
certain that in a global context there would always be some actors bound in to 
such rules who would share such doubts and one of the bases of shared rules 
being operable is that actors adhere to them even in such situations of 
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dissatisfaction. So internationally illegal war, endorsed by Beck, seems to 
undermine global cosmopolitan politics.  
 
2) National benefit. Beck also considers why in some cases military humanist 
interventions happen while in others they do not (2006: 145-6). There are a 
number of difficulties with what he suggests. Amongst these are reasons which 
Beck outlines which show that the sort of military interventions he points to could 
be to do with factors other than cosmopolitan humanism and which become 
revealed as such by a framework based more than Beck’s is on conflicting 
interests. The advantages of a conflict perspective over Beck’s consensual 
perspective is a key theme for understanding his work.  
 
Beck gives three reasons why human rights interventions may happen in some 
cases but not others. The first is asymmetries of power. The weaker the rogue 
state the more likely he says the intervention is, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
being given as examples. This is not completely convincing an explanation by 
itself as there are weaker states than Serbia and Iraq where humanitarian 
concerns may have made intervention arguable for but where attacks have not 
happened, Sudan for instance.  
 
Beck also mentions egoism, for instance where human rights abuses may lead to 
consequences for states which are interveners and neighbours, and to more 
global effects in terms of phenomena such as refugees and terrorist attacks. But 
this explanation does not always work because in the cases focused on - 
Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan – there was little evidence that human rights 
abuses there were going to have a serious knock-on effect for the intervening 
states. In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq it may have been thought that terrorist 
attacks would have global consequences, although it later became clear that the 
WMD evidence on Iraq had been weak. It was also evident that terrorist attacks 
were as likely to be increased as a result of intervening as curtailed by doing so. 
The July 7th bombings in London can be explained in this way.  
 
Bu the key issue explanation is the one which is most convincing. Beck highlights 
national benefit, such as oil and geostrategic advantages. But it is not clear why 
national benefit is an add-on advantage which facilitates a human rights 
intervention in some places over others rather than the other way round, human 
rights as a legitimation for what is primarily a national benefit intervention. Why 
national benefit should be considered as an addition to human rights justifications 
for intervention rather than a principle reason above human rights interventions in 
the cases outlined, is not clear.  
 
3) Abridged Cosmopolitanism. In specific comments on US military interventions 
Beck adds qualifications which cast doubt on interpretations of such interventions 
as in accordance with global cosmopolitanism. As in other parts of his theories 
Beck adds these as qualifications rather than seeing them as points which 
undermine the basis of his argument. For instance Beck argues that US power 
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constitutes an abridged cosmopolitanism (2006: 125-6). He says that 
‘cosmopolitan America has an elective affinity with Amnesty International … 
American mega-power throws its weight behind the global realization of human 
rights and democracy’. But this is a contestable interpretation and Beck goes on 
to say that this cosmopolitanism is abridged.  
 
First, he argues that human rights and democracy are norms on which it is 
expected that other parts of the world should live up to American values. This 
undermines some of his arguments for cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism 
reflects, or will be seen to reflect, a US or western view of how the world should 
be rather than a genuinely cosmopolitan view.  
 
Second, Beck sees the US as a global ordering power, possessing super-
sovereignty, which has an anti-cosmopolitan moment when it sees itself above 
borders in an absolutist manner and refuses to submit to norms itself. This 
happens, for instance, on arms reduction, and so, he says, destroys the 
contractual architecture of disarmament. To this could be added other areas 
where US non-collaboration also may have such effects, for instance agreements 
on reducing global warming and international justice. Beck says there is a 
contradiction in a state committing itself to global democracy while paying scant 
regard to democratic norms itself in a project of hegemonic universalism. This 
seems to damn the possibility of cosmopolitan democracy through the US. Yet 
for Beck these comments are added to his prescription of US cosmopolitanism 
as a qualification or anti-cosmopolitan ‘moment’ rather than as something which 
is more fundamentally undermining. They are put in as qualifications or additions 
to the argument on the US as cosmopolitan, rather than as structuring the 
argument on its cosmopolitanism to show that it is not so (2006: 125-6). 
 
This takes on extra significance when Beck argues that global cosmopolitanism 
must also be a military humanism and cannot dispense with the means of 
violence (2006: 127-8). If human rights and cosmopolitanism are as ‘abridged’ as 
Beck says, in fact even more undermined and compromised than merely 
‘abridged’ as I am suggesting his arguments imply, then adding military power to 
this project becomes especially problematic. Beck also argues that military 
humanism should be multilateral and co-operative (2006: 129), something which 
was quite limited in the cases he mentions frequently, Kosovo and Iraq, where 
the extent of multilateralism or co-operation is arguable. So he is arguing for a 
military dimension to a politics which is much less cosmopolitan and multilateral 
than he suggests. 
 
Another qualification that Beck makes further undermines the case for the USA 
as cosmopolitan (2006: 140). Beck argues that there is a new logic which 
involves turning a blind eye to human rights violations. The danger of terrorism, 
he says, suppresses the alertness of political allies to human rights violations. As 
in other places in Beck’s analysis this is stated in an abstract way without 
references to a concrete case in particular. However it is difficult not to see this 
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as applicable to the US who Beck has otherwise defined as driven by human 
rights concerns, and who with this argument now fall into his category for those 
who violate human rights in pursuit of a ‘war on terror’.  
 
Beck further extends his argument on state violations of human rights in such 
situations. He says this can be endorsed by international institutions. States have 
a carte blanche in defining their enemies as ‘terrorists’ which then gets the 
blessing of the international community and human rights violations are treated 
‘with discretion’. Elsewhere he refers to the view that criticises the west not for 
having human rights standards but for failing to apply them when it provides 
support for dictatorships, corrupt regimes or state terror (2006: 167). The 
indication, then, seems to be that western regimes which can be the agents of 
cosmopolitanism fall short on their own standards of human rights. 
 
These qualifications on the second age of modernity as a cosmopolitan one in 
which the US acts with cosmopolitan intent build up to an extent that the theory 
they are qualifying seems increasingly undermined in its basic substance. Beck’s 
points undermine his claims about the US, Europe and the West’s human rights 
cosmopolitan responsibility. Elsewhere in a lecture which labels the Iraq war as a 
WMD intervention his case becomes more undermined when he describes this 
war as a fake cosmopolitanism (2006a: 17). He says a fake cosmopolitanism 
instrumentalises cosmopolitan rhetoric for national-hegemonic purposes and the 
Iraq war is given as an example. He warns against the abuse of cosmopolitanism 
and knocks down the case he has made elsewhere about Iraq as a humanitarian 
war about WMD.  
 
To sum up some of these points, Beck has outlined qualifications which show 
how cosmopolitanism can be illegal according to international agreements, 
involve asymmetries of power, the pursuit of national-hegemonic egoism, human 
rights violations which are legitimised, westernisation imposed on others, and the 
exemption of cosmopolitan actors from cosmopolitan norms on human rights. All 
of this adds up to what is said can be an abridged or fake cosmopolitanism which 
can be militarily imposed. These are intended as qualifications to the outline of 
cosmopolitanism but in the range and significance of what has been outlined as 
aspects of cosmopolitan interventions Beck has undermined the claim that they 
can be seen as cosmopolitan.  
 
For reasons of space I have to be brief in my conclusions. In this article I have 
looked at arguments for a cosmopolitan approach to global inequality and human 
rights. 1) Cosmopolitanism does not bring a new and unique perspective on 
global inequality, as suggested. In fact in proposals on migration Beck sets out 
something which may reinforce inequality and anti-cosmopolitanism. 2) I have 
argued that the ‘both/and’ perspective on hybridisation and contextual 
universalism is undermined by structures of conflict and power that are glossed 
over. 3) I have also argued that the western cosmopolitan humanitarian 
intervention prescribed falls short of cosmopolitanism, in ways which are shown 
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by qualifications that Beck himself makes in his arguments. Beck’s approach 
effectively disguises conflicts, inequalities and injustices in world society and 
harmonises contradictions with a benign and optimistic view of international 
relations. An understanding of conflict and power in the tradition of critical 
sociology can bring out the problems in cosmopolitan sociology and politics and 
provide the basis for an alternative perspective for understanding global 
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